In processing and manufacturing industries, there has been a large push to produce higher quality products and ensure maximum efficiency of processes. This requires approaches to effectively detect and resolve disturbances to ensure optimal operations. While the control system can compensate for many types of disturbances, there are changes to the process which it still cannot handle adequately.
Introduction
In industrial manufacturing processes, a fault is defined as any abnormal deviation from the normal operating condition (NOC). It is a concern because even small faults in a complex industrial system can initiate a series of events that result in loss of efficiency and reliability. As a result, there is a need for techniques to improve a process' reliability and up-time. Effective fault detection and identification (FDI) are important monitoring components for making appropriate maintenance decisions. First, fault detection determines whether a fault has occurred in the system (also characterized as anomaly detection in other applications). Then fault identification determines which observation variables are most relevant to diagnosing the fault detected, thereby helping operators to focus on specific subsystems. By accurately and promptly detecting and identifying faults, one can more effectively inform operators and engineers in the process monitoring scheme and significantly reduce their impact and the time to recover to the NOC.
A number of fault detection and identification methods have been previously proposed in the literature. Since analytical and knowledge-based methods are impractical in large-scale modern industrial processes, data-driven methods have dominated the literature for the past decade and have been most effective in practice, taking advantage of increasing levels of instrumentation and widespread availability of sensor data (Qin, 2009; Ge et al., 2013; Yin et al., 2014; . However, the choice of model used to characterize the NOC and deviations thereof is still a crucial aspect in these methods because the limitations of the model lead to decreased detection rates or increased levels of fault alarms.
A number of methods based on traditional statistical multivariate data-driven models, such as principal component analysis (PCA) (Jolliffe, 2011) and partial least squares (PLS) (Kourti and MacGregor, 1996) , have been used for fault detection in the industry with varying degrees of success. For example, PCA models the correlations between different variables in the process. It can detect faults effectively when the sensor measurements are highly correlated, which is often the case. However, the temporal dynamics also need to be taken into consideration, especially when fast sampling rates are used, because this provides an additional dimension through which to detect deviations from the NOC. To that end, dynamic principal component analysis (DPCA) was proposed to handle serially correlated multivariate observations (Ku et al., 1995) . DPCA can be viewed as a multivariate autoregressive model with exogenous inputs (ARX). However, both of these methods are limited by the linear model structure and correlations in the process' dynamics.
Extensions using nonlinear PCA models have also being proposed to address these issues (Lee et al., 2004; Hsieh, 2007) , but they are still limited in their ability to model the process dynamics. Still, an approach that can effectively model nonlinear system structure and dynamics has been an active research field.
Neural network (NN) based methods have also received significant attention because of their capability and flexibility for modeling complex structure and temporal dynamics. NN models have been used for fault detection in one of two general frameworks: (i) as a fault classification tool between normal and known faulty conditions (Zarei et al., 2014; Chine et al., 2016; Ince et al., 2016; Jia et al., 2016; Wu and Zhao, 2018; Hu and Jiang, 2018; Li et al., 2014; Zhang and Zhao, 2017) , or (ii) as a model of the input-output variable relationships during NOC (Malhotra et al., 2015; Patan et al., 2008; Moustapha and Selmic, 2008; Talebi et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2016; Nie et al., 2018) . The first approach can be highly effective due to up-front knowledge of specific fault conditions to detect. These methods can also be setup to classify each fault which directly enables fault diagnosis. On the other hand, training these NNs requires substantial amounts of data under fault conditions but this data is usually quite limited for chemical manufacturing processes, whereas NOC data is much more abundant. Moreover, it is hard to assess the performance of these methods for fault conditions other than those for which the classifier was explicitly trained for. In the second approach, NNs are used to model the process by capturing the nonlinear, multivariate, and temporal dependencies from inputs to outputs. In this approach, the NN models are typically trained on NOC data to predict the system outputs. This is then used for fault detection during runtime by comparing the predictions of the NN with the actual system output measurements, and a fault is detected if the difference is significantly large. This approach has the advantage that the NNs are trained using only NOC data which is usually abundant, and that they are not constrained by the type of fault because detection is marked from any significant deviation from the NOC. On the other hand, the model must accurately characterize these complex and potentially nonlinear structures between inputs and outputs in the process, or its fault detection performance will suffer as a result. Moreover, only faults that break the input-output relationships are considered, meaning that faults due to input disturbances will likely not be detected.
There are other challenges regarding both approaches which have limited the application of NNs in the industry. First, fault identification has not yet been properly addressed. Once a fault is detected, it is typically difficult to identify the input variables most relevant to the fault from a complex NN model. And, even if an NN is trained to directly classify the fault, the underlying cause may still be unclear if there are multiple explanations for the observed fault type. Secondly, standard NNs are deterministic models which lack an estimate of the uncertainty in the model outputs. However, uncertainty and probabilistic estimates are important to assess the confidence level associated with the decision of detecting a fault and for fault identification. Lastly, NNs are prone to overfitting, meaning that they can "memorize" characteristics of the training data. This must be addressed to ensure good generalization to the full space of operating conditions of a complex industrial process.
For fault identification, contribution plots (Miller et al., 1998) are one of the most popular techniques for providing information on the variables that are most strongly related with the faults. In the context of PCA-based methods, contribution plots are obtained by quantifying the contribution of each process variable to the individual scores of the PCA representation (Westerhuis et al., 2000) .
Methods based on the contribution of each process variable in the residual space have also been developed (Wise et al., 1989) . However, the above-mentioned limitations with PCA-based approaches will also be reflected in the identification procedure and those methods require extra processing steps after fault detection. Moreover, those methods only provide the relative contribution value of each variable which is not very useful. A more valuable and precise measure to aid operators in diagnosis would be the probable severity of each affected variable. On the other hand, in the past it has been hard to extend contributions plots to NNs due to the complex and nonlinear relationships between predictions and model inputs.
In this paper, we propose a novel end-to-end fault detection and identification framework which adopts a recently developed Bayesian recurrent neural network (BRNN) architecture (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016a) . The proposed FDI framework is fundamentally different from the two types of frameworks that have been previously used in the NN-based fault detection literature. The proposed framework utilizes BRNNs to model the joint distribution and dynamics between all process variables. This is represented by estimates of the prediction uncertainty, which capture both model uncertainty and the inherent noise in the data. The Bayesian RNN is realized using the variational dropout approach proposed in Gal and Ghahramani (2016b,a) due to its simplicity, regularization capability, strong generalization ability, and scalability. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time Bayesian spatio-temporal models, and BRNNs in particular, have been successfully applied to fault detection and identification in chemical manufacturing industry. The proposed approach tackles three key challenges typical of manufacturing systems: (1) nonlinearity, (2) non-Gaussian distributed variables, and (3) high-degree of spatio-temporal correlations. Furthermore, the probabilistic framework provided by BRNNs enables more sensitive and robust fault detection and identification. Fault identification through the proposed BRNN-based approach provides easily interpretable visualizations to the plant operators, for quick fault type categorization, and analysis of the possible fault propagation path and root cause determination using engineering judgement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to RNNs and BRNNs, and describes the variational dropout approach used in this paper for inference in BRNNs. In Section 3, the proposed BRNN-based fault detection and identification methodology is presented. In Section 4, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated and compared to (D)PCA-based methods in the Tennessee Eastman process and a real chemical manufacturing process, followed by conclusions in Section 5.
Background

Recurrent Neural Networks
RNNs were developed in the 1980s (Elman, 1990) . Since then, RNNs have been shown to achieve state-of-the-art performance on a wide range of sequential data modeling tasks, including language modeling, speech recognition, image captioning, and music composition Jozefowicz et al., 2016; Merity et al., 2016) . Generally speaking, an RNN comprises an input layer, one or more hidden recurrent layers, and an output layer. The input layer corresponds directly to the input data, and hidden recurrent layers capture the state with the response of its nodes being added to the inputs on the next time step. At each time t, denote the input to the network as x t ∈ R mx , the state (i.e., output of the hidden layer) as s t ∈ R ms , and the RNN output asŷ t ∈ R my . They Figure 1 : A simple RNN structure with one recurrent layer and showing the unfolding in time of the sequence of its forward computation. The RNN includes the input variable xt, state variable st and outputsŷt. The state variable st is calculated based on the previous state s t−1 and the current input xt. The RNN outputŷt is then calculated based on the current state. In this way, the input sequence xt is mapped to output sequenceŷt with eachŷt depending on all previous inputs. The model parameters ω = {Ws, Us, Ws, bs, by} are shared at each time step.
are represented as row vectors in the equations. Accordingly, the state and output layers have the general form:
where the subscript s = 1, . . . , m s is the index over hidden layer nodes, θ s and f s denote the corresponding hidden layer parameter/weights and nonlinear operator for each node, and W y ∈ R ms×my and b y ∈ R my are the output layer parameters. Note the dependency of the new state of the network on that of the previous time step, emblematic of recurrent architectures. This dependency, and the unfolding through time, is depicted in Figure 1 . A linear output layer is commonly used for regression tasks.
In the simpler form of nodes, the state is computed as (Elman, 1990) :
where W s ∈ R mx×ms , U s ∈ R ms×ms , and b s ∈ R ms } are the hidden layer parameters (denoted θ above), and φ is an element-wise activation function such as the logistic, hyperbolic tangent, or a rectifier linear function.
As can be explicitly observed from the mathematical formulation in eq. (1), RNNs are essentially state-space models capable of modeling nonlinear dependencies. They can capture complex nonlinear dynamics of a system in the state. Also, by appropriately training the parameters, they can adapt to the right level of temporal depth. Thus, RNNs models are considerably more powerful for modeling complex industrial processes in comparison to traditional statistical methods.
It is worth noting that different RNN architectures have been proposed (Jordan, 1997) , with the formulation in eq. (1) corresponding to Elman's architecture (Elman, 1990) , which has widely used in the recent deep learning RNN implementations and applications.
In order to learn the parameters of the RNN, an optimization problem is defined with regard to an appropriate loss function. For regression tasks this loss function is typically chosen to be the mean squared loss,
or the cross-entropy loss for classification purposes,
where Θ denotes the collection of all RNN model parameters, and y t is the desired output at time step t. In addition, L 2 regularization terms are often added to help prevent overfitting, resulting in the overall minimization objective
where λ is the regularization (a.k.a., weight decay) parameter.
Because the recurrence introduces dependencies between time steps, training RNNs involves backpropagation through time (BPTT) to compute the gradient update of the model weights that minimizes the loss function (Werbos, 1990) . BPTT corresponds to an unfolding of the network over a number of time steps, as depicted in Figure 1 . For BPTT, the difference between network outputs and target values is first calculated and stored for each time step in a forward pass, and then the weight gradient updates are calculated as the network is "rolled back". However, simple
RNNs trained with BPTT can have difficulties learning long-range time dependencies due to the vanishing gradient problem (Bengio et al., 1994) . To alleviate the vanishing gradient problem, recurrent node gating mechanisms have been recently developed. These gating mechanisms allow information and the gradients to flow through the unrolled network with minimal attenuation if determined to be necessary by BPTT. These gating mechanisms resulted in two popular variations on RNN hidden units: long short-term memory (LSTM) units (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) and gated recurrent units (GRUs) (Cho et al., 2014) . RNNs with LSTM and GRU units have been reported to show salient performance (Graves et al., 2013; Cakir et al., 2015) .
Bayesian Recurrent Neural Networks
Bayesian Recurrent Neural Networks (BRNNs) combine statistical modeling of RNN parameters to obtain a probabilistic model of input-output mapping. This means that, instead of point estimates,
BRNNs can effectively perform Bayesian inference which provides probabilistic distributions over the outputs.
To realize that, BRNNs view the model parameters ω = {W s , W y , U s , b s , b y } as random variables from a prior distribution p (ω). Expressing the functional dependence in eq. (1) as s t = f ω s (x t , s t−1 ) andŷ t = f ω y (s t ), the likelihood of the output for each data point is,
where τ is the precision parameter that reflects the intrinsic noise in the data, and it is assumed that the likelihood function has a normal distribution for simplicity. Note how the likelihood function is evaluated with respect to forward passes through the neural network.
Then, given a training dataset comprising X and Y, learning entails estimating the posterior distribution p(ω|X, Y) over the space of parameters. And, with the updated distribution, the distribution of a predicted output y * can be obtained by integration
where the dependency on the precision parameter, state and past inputs were omitted. For the prior distribution, standard zero-mean Gaussian priors over the weight matrices p(W) and p(U) are typically chosen, with point estimates for the bias vectors assumed for simplicity. The uncertainty in the prediction will be directly reflected in the posterior distribution p(y * |x * , X, Y).
Unfortunately, in complex models such as neural networks, exact inference of the posterior is not possible. Moreover, traditional algorithms for approximating the Bayesian inference are generally not applicable to train RNNs with large number of parameters or complex architectures. To overcome this limitation, several approximation inference methods have been proposed including variational dropout (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b,a) , Bayes by BackProp (Pawlowski et al., 2017; Fortunato et al., 2017) , multiplicative normalizing flows (Louizos and Welling, 2017) , and probabilistic backpropagation (Hernández-Lobato and Adams, 2015) . Among all those techniques, the variational dropout technique proposed by Gal and Ghahramani (2016a) is adopted in this paper because of its simplicity and generalization capability. Details of this algorithm will be reviewed in the next section.
Variational dropout as Bayesian approximation
Gal and Ghahramani (2016b) showed how dropout could be used as a general variational approximation to the posterior of Bayesian neural networks (BNNs), and which can be applied directly to a variety of NN architectures. The main advantage of this "variational dropout" approach is that it does not require significant modifications to the model architecture and training method, unlike other probabilistic approximation methods. Moreover, the uncertainty estimation incurs only the Gal and Ghahramani (2016a) , dropout is applied to both input, recurrent and output layers with the same dropout mask at different time steps. Variational dropout is applied during both training and testing.
computation cost due to multiple stochastic forward passes through the network to generate samples of the posterior distribution.
Therefore, variational dropout is used here as variational inference approach for BNNs. Variational inference is a technique used to approximate an intractable posterior distribution p(ω|X, Y)
with a simpler parameterized distribution q(ω). Then, the integration in eq. (7) can be approximated simply by Monte Carlo (MC) integration using q(ω). Specifically, the approximation distribution is factorized over the weight matrices in ω. For each row w k , variational dropout imposes a variation distribution comprising a mixture of two Gaussian distributions with small variances,
where p is the predefined dropout probability, σ 2 is a small precision parameter, and m k is a variational parameter. The learning problem is then casted into an optimization problem by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between q(ω) and p(ω|X, Y). It can be shown that optimizing the loss function using dropout is equivalent to minimizing KL (q(ω) p(ω|X, Y))) (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b), which updates the variational parameter. Although variational inference is a biased approximation, it has been shown to work well in practice.
Variational dropout requires caution when applied in the context of RNNs, however. Because of the recurrence, naïvely applying standard dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) with different masks at each time step of an RNN can lead to model instabilities and disrupt an RNN's capability to model a sequence (Pham et al., 2014; Pachitariu and Sahani, 2013) . We use the approach in Gal and Ghahramani (2016a) to resolve these issues. Under these circumstances, variational dropout has been shown to also act as an effective regularization method for reducing overfitting by preventing co-adaptions in RNNs (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016a) .
The implementation of BRNNs with variational dropout is relatively straightforward. During both training and testing, the variational approximation involves sampling the model distribution with regard to the variational distribution over the weights, which is implemented by dropping out (i.e., forcing to zero) randomly chosen inputs, outputs, and hidden states. This results in multiple random realizations of the RNN model, each obtained by implicitly removing a portion of the inputs, outputs, or hidden states. However, as detailed in Gal and Ghahramani (2016a) , it is crucial for
RNNs that the dropout mask used for each model realization be kept fixed between time steps. Put another way, the dropout mask of which elements are zeroed-out is sampled and frozen for each time sequence sample. This sampling characteristic is contrasted to standard dropout in Figure 2 .
Variational dropout applied during testing can be viewed as an approximation to MC samples from the posterior predictive distribution, p (ω|X, Y). Given a new observation x * , by forward passing it through N stochastic model samples, we can collect N samples {ŷ * (i)} i=1,...,N of the approximate predictive posterior. The corresponding empirical estimators for the posterior predictive mean, standard deviation, and covariance are:
where τ can be estimated as τ = pl 2 2N λ given a pre-defined regularization/weight-decay parameter λ, and prior length scale l (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b) . Higher-order statistics can also be estimated by the samples by moment-matching.
Since the forward passes involve simply a number of independent and fixed realizations of the RNN model distribution, they can be done concurrently, thus making variational dropout a good candidate for online monitoring. In the next section, the proposed novel fault detection and identification scheme is explained in detail. While this methodology is described here in the context of chemical process monitoring, it can be observed that it could be readily extended to other manufacturing industries.
Methodology for fault detection and identification
The design of a fault detection and identification system generally begins with the development of a model to characterize the normal operating characteristics of a process. Historical data collected Figure 3 : General procedure for process monitoring system development (left) versus procedure for developing BRNNbased fault detection and identification system (right). General framework to establish a monitoring system begins with a model to characterize NOC behavior, such as using the BRNN model to learn the NOC pattern from the training data. Then, the method to measure the deviation of a particular observation to NOC region is chosen. In our case, the process observations are compared to the BRNN posterior predictive distributions. Finally, the decision will involve determining whether the acquired observation is from NOC or not (i.e., compare deviations of observations to the predictive distributions for fault detection and which variables are significantly deviated for identification).
during NOC are used to build the model, which makes this an unsupervised learning problem. Then, one must also establish an approach to characterize the magnitude of the deviation from NOC based on the developed model and determine when deviations are considered to be outside of the NOC.
For example, these include the T 2 and Q statistics commonly used to measure the distance of the observation to the NOC region in PCA-based models and thresholds thereon . Finally, given a new observation x * , these are calculated to determine whether x * deviates substantially from the NOC (fault detection) and, if that is the case, which variables are significantly affected (fault identification), thereby assisting in locating and troubleshooting the fault.
Specifically, this paper proposes using a BRNN with variational dropout to build the probabilistic model, denoted as f ω (·), and characterize the NOC and its intrinsic variability. As discussed earlier, BRNNs are capable of extracting the nonlinear spatial and temporal signatures in the data that are critical for characterizing complex chemical processes. Moreover, it provides probabilistic estimates of the likelihood of the observations with regard to its inferred posterior distribution of the variable values. These likelihood estimates lends themselves to be used to assess the current deviation level from the NOC region. Accordingly, observations are detected as corresponding to faults whenever their deviation is above a threshold, determined such that the number of false alarms under NOC does not exceed a predefined level. Fault identification then involves determining which process attributes are deviating significantly. This general framework for BRNN-based fault detection and identification is summarized in Figure 3 and described in detail in the following sections.
Fault detection
The first step toward fault detection is to learn a model to characterizing the NOC. In this case, this involves training a BRNN with variational dropout to model the dynamics in time and After training, the model outputx t+1 from the BRNN is sampled from the posterior predictive distribution for next observation x t+1 via variational dropout model realizations. This means that, at each time step t, the stochastic forward pass is repeated N times, each with a different dropout mask, and the predictive distribution of the output for t + 1 is approximated based on the MC samples of the BRNN model, {x t+1 (i)} i=1,...,N . Then, when the true observation x t+1 is available, it is compared to the predictive distribution and deemed as abnormal if it significantly deviates from the predictive distribution. Finally, the true observation is fed into the BRNN model and the procedure is repeated for the next time step.
Notice that the predictive distribution is evolving over time, which provides an adaptive decision boundary for the next measurement. This adaptive decision boundary is calculated based on all the useful past system information, which takes into consideration both the spatial and temporal correlations in the data. Further combined with the potential ability to model nonlinear correlations, this property increases both the detection sensitivity and robustness because of the increasing accuracy in modeling NOC pattern.
Depending on the complexity of the system and observed properties of the predictive distribution from the BRNN model, we now describe two methodologies to quantify the deviation magnitude of each observation to its corresponding predictive distribution. The first method is faster and simpler to implement but it is limited to Gaussian predictive posterior distributions. The second method approximates the posterior distribution non-parametrically and is much more flexible, but it requires tunning an additional density estimation parameter.
Method 1: Squared Mahalanobis distance for Gaussian predictive distributions
If the predictive distribution is Gaussian, or well approximated as such, the squared Mahalanobis distance can be used to characterize the magnitude of the deviation. First, the MC samples at time t of the predictive distribution, {x t (i)} i=1,...,N , are used to approximate the sample mean µ t and covariance S t ,
Then, when the true observation x t is available, the squared Mahalanobis distance is calculated as
A larger value of M 2 indicates that the observation x t is far away from the predicted mean and there is an higher likelihood that it corresponds to a fault. The detection threshold M 2 th is determined with regard to a chosen maximum false alarm rate α on a validation dataset. That is, the threshold is the (1−α) percentile of the M 2 statistic in the MC samples of the validation dataset.
Therefore, any data point with M 2 exceeding the threshold (M 2 > M 2 th ) should be detected as a fault.
Method 2: Local density ratio for non-Gaussian predictive distributions
If the predictive distribution is not well characterized by a Gaussian distribution (e.g., because it is multi-modal), then non-parametric methods are necessary to quantify the abnormality of each observation. For those cases, a local density ratio (LDR) method is proposed, which is closely related to the so-called local outlier factor (Breunig et al., 2000) . The LDR statistic quantifies the abnormality of each new observation with respect to its predictive distribution using an estimate of the density around the observation based on its k-nearest-neighbors (k-NNs).
The k-NN local density estimatef (x) can be calculated as (Duda et al., 2001) f
where N k (x) denotes the set of k-NNs of x in {x t (i)} i=1,...,N and d(p, x) is the Euclidean distance between x and a point p ∈ N k (x). Intuitively, this means that points close to its k-NNs will have high local density value, whereas points in more sparsely sampled or spread out areas have low density.
Then, the local density ratio for an observation x t is defined as
which is the ratio of the averaged local density of the k-NNs of x t in {x t (i)} i=1,...,N to the local density of x t . A larger value of the LDR(x t ) means that the observed point is far away from the samples of the prediction posterior and thus indicates higher likelihood that the observation x t is abnormal.
The number of k-NNs specifies the smallest number of data points in a cluster that will be considered as abnormal and is crucial for the algorithm to perform properly. In general, this involves a trade-off because a small value of k will result in large fluctuations whereas a very large value of k will reduce the detection sensitivity. As recommended in Breunig et al. (2000) , one can choose a minimum and maximum k and, for each observation, take the maximum of LDR over k as the final value.
The detection threshold LDR th is obtained similarly to M 2 th .
Fault identification
Once a fault is detected, the next goal is to identify the main variables associated with it.
Without using labeled fault examples, this involves determining the observation variables with the abnormal deviations, and which are thus most relevant to locate and troubleshoot the fault by helping operators to focus on specific subsystems.
BRNN fault identification is obtained by applying the fault detection approach but independently for each variable. To determine which variables deviate abnormally, each observation variable is compared to its corresponding predicted marginal posterior distribution estimated from the BRNN samples. More specifically, the observation x j t , corresponding to the jth system variable at time t, is compared to the predictive posterior distribution characterized by the samples {x j t (i)]} i=1,...,N . This variable-wise comparison allows us to identify variables with values in low probability areas and thus more likely to be relevant for diagnosing the fault.
It is worth noting that the marginal posterior distributions used for identification still take into consideration the spatial and temporal correlations in past data observations. Hence, the marginal distribution for each variable also evolve over time with dynamics that depend on other variables and past observations. This analysis sacrifices some information with regard to the complete joint distribution, as considered during fault detection, but is necessary to obtain variable specificity.
As with fault detection, two methodologies to quantify the fault identification deviation are described here depending on the properties or assumptions placed on the predictive distribution.
The same considerations apply to these methodologies.
Method 1: Standard deviation for Gaussian predictive distributions
Assuming that the predictive distribution can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution, the number of standard deviations of each variable to its predictive mean can be used to measure the deviation. Using the same MC samples of the posterior predictive distribution generated for fault detection at time t, x t (i) = {x l t (i)} l=1,...,mx i=1,...,N , the mean µ l t and standard deviation σ l t of each variablex l t can be estimated with
The deviation for each variable D l , l ∈ {1, . . . , m x }, is then calculated as,
Note that D l can be either negative or positive, unlike M 2 which can only be positive. Of course, under a Gaussian approximation, variables are identified as significantly affected by the disturbance based only on whether D l has a large magnitude (i.e., absolute value). Still, the sign of the deviation (positive or negative) can be helpful to operators because it explicitly indicates whether the variable is significantly higher or lower than expected. For a pre-defined significance level, the NOC validation dataset can be used to determine thresholds {D l th } i=1,...,N such that variables with (D l > D l th ) are explicitly highlighted as abnormal.
Method 2: Local density ratio for non-Gaussian predictive distributions
For more general distributions, and similarly to the fault detection procedure, the local density ratio can be used element-wise for fault identification by considering each variable separately in the calculation of the LDR. Given the true measurement x t = x l t l=1,...,mx and MC samples from predictive distribution {x l t (i)} l=1,...,mx i=1,...,N , the local density ratio for variable l can be calculated as,f
where p l is the one of the k-NNs of x l t and d(p l , x l t ) is the Euclidean distance between the p l and x l t sample. The same rule for selecting the number of nearest neighbors k discussed with regard to fault detection can be used here.
The variables associated with large value of LDR l can be explicitly selected as significantly affected by the fault. This is done similarly as for fault detection using the NOC validation dataset to determine a threshold LDR l th above which variables are considered abnormal. Or, the variables can simply be sorted from largest to smallest such to emphasize the system variables that deviate the most.
Fault identification plots
The fault identification statistics of each variable can be visualized by plotting them over time.
The resulting plots are visually similar to those from contribution plots (Miller et al., 1998; Zhu and Braatz, 2014) . However, their interpretation and analysis is fundamentally different, and are referred here as identification plots. The main distinction is the statistics in identification plots are specific to the current status of each variable and its dynamics, rather than as a relative component of a global statistic. This provides greater specificity in the analysis and allows us to interpret the status of each variable directly.
Fault detection and identification scheme
For completeness, the overall methodology is summarized in Figure 5 . Although the figure shows explicitly the two methods for detecting and identifying faults, this decision is of course done at design time. In either case, the BRNN model with variational dropout is crucial to the methodology by providing samples that characterize the uncertainty and directly enable both fault detection and identification. The M 2 or LDR statistics are used to detect the fault in the system, while the D l or LDR l statistics are used to identify the impacted variables useful for locating the fault and possible root cause analysis. Put another way, minimal computation is needed for fault identification, having to calculate only some additional statistics on the same samples. 
Case studies
In this section, the effectiveness of the proposed BRNN-based fault detection and identification method is demonstrated on two case studies: the benchmark Tennessee Eastman process synthetic dataset and a real dataset from a chemical plant.
For comparison, results are also shown for PCA (Jackson and Mudholkar, 1979; Kourti and MacGregor, 1996) and DPCA (Ku et al., 1995) fault detection and identification methods. For each method, both models with and without dimension reduction are considered, and identified by prefix 'r-' or 'f-', respectively. For the models with reduced dimension, parallel analysis (Downs and Vogel, 1993) was used to determine the number of principal components a to retain in the model. These (D)PCA-based methods are commonly accepted benchmark methods for algorithm comparison in the fault detection and identification community Yin et al., 2014; De Ketelaere et al., 2015; Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003; Franklin et al., 1995) . The DPCA methods in particular provide an interesting contrast to the proposed BRNN method because they also model both spatial and temporal correlations, albeit in a limited form. As mentioned in the introduction, these methods are limited to linear dynamics and correlations and scale poorly with increased temporal memory depth. The proposed BRNN method does not have these limitations, however.
In both case studies, different BRNN model configurations and parameters have been tested. This included different recurrent node types (regular RNN, GRU, and LSTM cells), activation functions (i.e., linear, sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, and rectifier linear), number of recurrent nodes/states m s , number of recurrent layers, regularization hyperparameter values λ, dropout probabilities p d , and RNN training parameters (e.g., learning rate). Only the results for final BRNN model are shown in the following sections.
Tennessee Eastman process
The Tennessee Eastman process (TEP) is a well-known benchmark by the Eastman Chemical Company for process monitoring and control studies. It is based on a realistic industrial process with properly modified components, kinetics, and operating conditions (Downs and Vogel, 1993) . In this study, the second plant-wide control strategy was utilized, with the process flowsheet as shown in Figure 6 . The process contains eight components (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H) and five major units (a reactor, condenser, compressor, separator and stripper).
The process contains m x = 52 variables in total, of which 41 are sensor measurements (XMEAS (1) -XMEAS (41)) and 11 are manipulated variables (XMV(1)-XMV (11)). During NOC, the system is operating under one production mode and the sampling period is set to 3 min. The training data contains 480 samples and the validation data contains 960 samples. The TEP simulation contains 21 preprogrammed faults with different disturbance types and locations. Once a fault is introduced in the system, the system will either behave normally if the control system is effective in controlling the disturbance, or it will evolve outside the NOC region. For each set of data with a fault condition, the simulator first runs for 160 time points in the normal state, and then the corresponding fault disturbance is introduced with the simulator continuing to run for another 800 samples. 1 For further details about the TEP dataset, the reader is referred to Downs and Vogel (1993) or .
Although a number of BRNN model architecture variations here tried as previously mentioned, the final BRNN model used in this case study contains one recurrent layer with regular RNN cell and linear activation function. A linear dense layer was used for the output layer, as is commonly done for regression tasks. This means that in this case the BRNN model implements a probabilistic linear state-space model. Although this is a simpler architecture, it is also easier to train and achieved better performance than more complex structures and neuron types. This might be due to the fact that the inherent correlations and dynamics in the NOC data of TEP are well modeled as linear (Sun and Braatz, 2018 ). The final model has m s = 80 hidden nodes in the recurrent layer, and was trained with regularization parameter λ = 10 −4 and dropout rate p d = 0.1. Given the linear structure of the model and by the central limit theorem, the predictive distribution by the final BRNN model is clearly well approximated by the Gaussian distribution in this case. Thus, the M 2 and D l statistics are used for fault detection and identification.
For the reduced dimensionality (D)PCA models used in the comparison, the number of principal components determined by parallel analysis was a = 12 for r-PCA and a = 25 for r-DPCA (with lag = 1). The fault detection procedure for r-PCA and r-DPCA use both the T 2 and Q statistics, 
FDR = # of samples with alarm after the fault is introduced in the system total # of samples after the fault is introduced in the system
In words, the FAR corresponds to the frequency of spurious detection of faults under NOC, and FDR is the sample frequency of a fault being detected when a fault situation is present.
It is important to note that the dataset contains three general types of faults: controllable faults, back to control faults, and uncontrollable faults. Controllable faults are disturbances that can be well compensated by the control system, and therefore the disturbance does not significantly affect the process state. In these situations, since they do not require an operator to intervene, the FDR should ideally be as low as the FAR to avoid distracting the operators. Back to control faults are disturbances that are large enough to cause the system to initially deviate from the NOC, but for which the control system is able to compensate at least some aspects of the disturbance after some time. This means that the process measurements return to the normal region after some time, but certain manipulated or input variables remain outside the normal regime. These represent suboptimal or off-spec conditions that ought to be handle by an operator, and to be detected accordingly.
Moreover, the fault detection and identification result should accurately reflect the system state, such that its evolution back to control is clearly apparent. Finally, uncontrollable faults are faults that cannot be handled adequately by the control system and require operator intervention. For both back to control and uncontrollable faults, the fault detection algorithm should ideally yield high FDR to notify the operator that the system has been disturbed outside the NOC. Then, to validate the model, the trained BRNN model was applied to a separate NOC validation dataset. These results are shown in Figure 8 . As observed in the training results, the validation real measurements lie within the predictive distribution. This result indicates that the model generalizes well, meaning that it is able to capture the normal pattern without overfitting to the training data, which is crucial to avoiding high FARs.
Fault detection results
The fault detection results for the 21 pre-defined faults are shown in Table 1 . The results are grouped according to one of the above-mentioned three types of faults. For all algorithms, the FDRs were estimated with regard to the threshold estimated for a FAR of 5%, and validated on NOC data as shown on the first row of the table.
As shown in Table 1 , the proposed BRNN-based method yields close to 5% FDR on controllable faults, which is almost as low as the pre-determined FAR level. On the other hand, (D)PCA-based methods are overly sensitive in these cases, especially the models without model reduction, f-PCA and f-DPCA. These results show that (D)PCA-based methods cannot accurately differentiate the controllable faults from the other cases, because they do not appropriately characterize the dynamics of NOC such as to determine if the situation is ultimately controllable. As previously explained, controllable faults should not trigger an alert because they are handled directly by the control system. The ability of the fault detection approach to differentiate between these situations is of crucial practical important because alerts due to these situations will often be perceived as false alarms and can erode an operator's confidence in the method and the significance of its alerts.
These results show that the BRNN method is clearly more robust to controllable fault than the (D)PCA methods. For both back to control and uncontrollable faults, the BRNN method reliably detects faults with high FDR. Full PCA and DPCA models with the squared Mahalanobis distance are also able to detect the back to control and uncontrollable faults with high FDR. However, they seem overly sensitive for general fault detection purposes because they overreact to controllable faults. Put another way, compared to the BRNN method, (D)PCA models emphasize higher sensitivity to disturbances at the expense an increased likelihood of unwarranted alerts. The reduced dimensionality (D)PCA models (i.e., r-PCA and r-DPCA), with the number of principal components determined by parallel analysis, respond more reasonably to controllable faults but also yield much worse performance compared to the BRNN method. In fact, they fail to reliably detect several back to control and uncontrollable faults (Faults 5, 16, and 19 for example).
It is insightful to consider how the temporal dynamics and how they interact with the detection approach leads to the measured FDRs results. If a disturbance is such that the measurements oscillate around the NOC region, there will be moments in time that are momentarily indistinguishable from those in the NOC region. And, since the BRNN was trained such that its state characterizes the NOC distribution in state space, it is understandable that some of these time points may not be is handled immediately and directly by the control system, it does not drive the process outside its normal operating state. In this case, a data-driven fault detection algorithm should not trigger the alarm (beyond the chosen FAR).
The prediction results by the BRNN model are shown in Figure 9 . Similarly to the NOC case, the dark blue lines (i.e., real measurements) are within the distribution high-likelihood area characterized by the light blue lines, which indicates that the system is operating under NOC.
Fault identification results by the BRNN and (D)PCA methods are shown in Figures 10 and 11, respectively. The color indicates the deviation from NOC over time for each of the 52 variables. The D l statistic (c.f., eq. (19)) was used in the BRNN identification plot. As is shown in Figure 10 , the BRNN model identified that no variable had its normal operating dynamics significantly affected by Fault 3, as was expected. In contrast, the contribution plots in Figures 11(b) and (d) , by the full PCA and DPCA models, incorrectly identify several variables as being affected by the disturbance even before the introduction of the disturbance (at the 160th sample). This further demonstrates the oversensitiveness of those models. The r-PCA and r-DPCA models have identification results that are similar to those of the BRNN model and are somewhat robust to controllable faults, but at the expense of robustness in fault detection. In summary, for controllable faults, BRNN-based fault detection and identification is robust and successfully characterizes those disturbances as corresponding to NOC. r-PCA and r-DPCA methods give similar fault identification results but have lower detection rates (c.f., Table 1 ). The f-PCA and f-DPCA models are clearly oversensitive, have high false alarm rates, and incorrectly characterize the controllable faults in the contribution plots.
Back to control fault: Fault 5
Fault 5 is a representative example of a back to control fault. This fault involves a step change in condenser cooling water inlet temperature. This step change requires a step change in the condenser cooling water flow rate XMV(11) by the control system. While the fault is ultimately controllable, the fault causes the system at first to operate off-spec, or at least sub-optimally. In this particular, immediately after the fault occurs, the system oscillates with about 32 variables exhibiting this similar trainset oscillation behavior. The process returns back to control after about 10 hours, at which point the sensor measurements XMEAS(1)-XMEAS(41) are back to their pre-disturbance set-points and only the manipulated variable XMV(11) remains outside the NOC regime, tuned such as to compensate the step change in condenser cooling water inlet temperature.
The BRNN results for all of the variables are shown in Figure 12 . As expected, when the fault is introduced, several measurements in dark blue lines deviate from the posterior predictive distribution under NOC shown in light blue. And, after about 200 data points the system returns back to control, verified by the fact that all the system measurements (XMEAS(1)-XMEAS(41)) are back within the predictive NOC region while only the manipulated variable XMV(11) maintains a systematic deviation off-the-center of the BRNN model prediction distribution. These results show that the BRNN model is able to correctly identify the NOC pattern and how the deviation from the predictive distribution accurately locates the faulty variable under disturbance. The BRNN model is also able to better assess the state of the system, distinguishing the back to control faults from the uncontrollable faults by showing the transient deviation of the process variables and their return to the NOC region.
The fault identification plot by BRNN is then shown in Figure 13 . This example clearly showcases the typical pattern of back to control faults, with several measurements outside the predictive region after the fault is introduced and only the manipulated variables deviating once the system is back to steady state. In this case, about 32 variables were affected once the disturbance is introduced to the system, and the color switches between blue and red, indicating the system is oscillating. The plot also clearly shows how, after the 360th time point, all system variables except XMV(11) are undoubtedly back to normal. XMV(11) remains consistently above the predictive mean after the fault as that is forced by the controller to compensate for the fault. However, the magnitude of the deviation of XMV(11) is relatively small, indicating that the disturbance is no longer critical. The BRNN identification plot also contains crucial information for locating the likely root cause of the fault. It clearly shows that XMEAS(22) is the first variable positively deviated from the predictive distribution, which indicates the higher than normal separator cooling water outlet temperature.
Combined with the fact that the condenser cooling water flow rate was increased to compensate for the disturbance to the system, one would reason that the root cause is the increase in the condenser cooling water temperature. After the condenser cooling water temperature increases, the outlet stream from the condenser to the separator also increases the temperature, resulting in an increase in the temperature in the separator, which finally results in the increase in separator cooling water outlet temperature.
For comparison, the contribution plots by PCA and DPCA methods are shown in Figure 14 . and identify variables in an unspecific manner. Of course, this prevents those statistics from being utilized, at least directly, by operators for diagnosing the root cause of the fault. Therefore, for back to control faults, BRNN fault detection and identification has shown high accuracy and robustness. Moreover, it yields more specific information for evaluating the state of the system. This means that, by inspecting the identification plot, operators have a clear view about which variables are affected by the disturbance and are able to assess the type of the fault occurring and the current stage of the system.
Uncontrollable fault: Fault 1
An uncontrollable fault is now considered. Fault 1 involves a step change in the A/C feed ratio in Stream 4, which results in an increase in the C feed and a decrease in the A feed. This leads to a decrease in feed A in the recycle Stream 5 and the controller reacts by increasing the A feed flow in Stream 1. However, these two effects conflict with each other, thereby shifting the system to an uncontrollable operating situation. The BRNN model output results are shown in Figure 15 . It can be clearly observed that after the fault is introduced to the system, more than half of the variables deviate significantly from the BRNN predictive NOC region. All of the (D)PCA methods are also capable of detecting this fault.
The corresponding BRNN fault identification statistics are then shown in Figure 16 . Since the system is seriously affected by the disturbance and several variables associated with material balances (e.g., composition, pressure) change significantly, this fault is easily detected. The long-term and uncontrollable nature of the fault on these measurement and manipulated variables can also be observed in the identification plot, making it easy to diagnose the fault based on those variables.
As before, the contribution plots by (D)PCA methods are shown in Figure 17 . The r-PCA and r-DPCA models, in (a) and (c), both give somewhat results similar to those of the BRNN model in Figure 16 . However, both of them fail to identify the continued deviation in XMV(4) 2 for instance, which is the manipulated variable for total feed flow in Stream 4 and clearly plays a central role in the fault. In contrast, it is clearly identifiable from the BRNN results in Figure 16 that XMV (4) (11)). As previously observed, this again shows that the f-PCA and f-DPCA models are overly sensitive and their identification results require substantial additional processing such that operators cannot directly use them to diagnose the fault.
In summary, the BRNN model is able to accurately and robustly detect and identify uncontrollable faults. Perhaps most crucially, BRNN identification plots provide clear information that is directly useful for root cause analysis. While several (D)PCA models are also able to detect uncon- This section shows how the accuracy and specificity of the BRNN identification statistics can be used for fault propagation path analysis. The key observation is that the chronological sequence of events of when each variable deviates significantly from its NOC is useful information to understand the start and evolution of the disturbance through the process (Chiang and Braatz, 2003) . The BRNN method can extract this information with a high degree of temporal precision. This information can then be combined with expert knowledge of the process to examine the propagation of the fault through the system. This is exemplified here using Fault 6, which is an uncontrollable fault induced by a loss of feed A in Stream 1. The loss of component A thus causes the control system to increase the manipulated variable XMV(3) in order to increase A in the system and attempt to compensate the disturbance.
However, since there is no component A in Stream 1, the control system fails to take the system back to NOC. Due to the severity of this fault, a large portion of system variables are affected. The temporal sequence of the fault through process is achieved by sorting the identification plot according to the time when each variable significantly deviates from the NOC. For this approach, one needs to estimate the threshold used to determine when the deviation is significant. In our case, this was estimated using the NOC validation set and determined to be D l th = 4.8. Then, once a fault is detected, the process variables are sorted according to the time index at which its D l statistic first exceeds the threshold, yielding the sorted identification plot shown in Figure 18 . The y-axis numbers 1-52 are indices corresponding to [XMEAS(1), . . . , XMEAS(41), XMV(1), . . . , XMV(11)].
A diagram of the fault propagation path is then obtained by combining the timing results of the sorted BRNN identification plot with the knowledge of the process, as demonstrated in Figure 19 for Fault 6. When the fault is introduced in the system, XMEAS(1) and XMV(3) are affected and deviated from the NOC first. Then, after a few minutes, XMEAS (7), the reactor pressure measurement, is affected. Then the reactor cooling water system is also affected due to the change in the mass inside the reactor and both XMEAS(21) and XMV(10) deviate from the NOC. The diagram in Figure 19 highlights that after 1 hour the fault had already propagated to the final product and the concentration of A and C have been affected, thus clearly showing the impact of the fault in the system at that point in time.
The approach outlined here shows how the properties of the BRNN method can used to easily determine and visualize the fault propagation path. This information is crucial to operators to accurately diagnose the fault and determine which parts of the process have been affected.
Real dataset
The next case study further demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed BRNN method on a real dataset from a chemical manufacturing process. The use of this method for real-time fault detection and identification is a promising application for the next generation of process monitoring systems in chemical plants. The complex nature of real chemical manufacturing processes and their intricate control system dynamics, make BRNN the best suited tool to extract and recognize these patterns from data in comparison to traditional methods.
The dataset pertains to the operation of an Amine tower. The column experienced foaming issues resulting in faults that decreased the efficiency of the process. There are a total of 20 sensor measurements with a sampling time of t = 1 min. A total of two months of data was available.
Two events had been recorded by operators as a result of the foaming issue in the tower. However, it was also possible that additional disturbances were encountered during the two-month operating window that had been previously missed. The final BRNN model uses standard RNN cells with the sigmoid activation function. There is one hidden recurrent layer with 40 units (i.e., "state variables"). The dropout probability was set to p d = 0.1 and the regularization parameter to λ = 10 −5 . The BRNN model using LSTM or GRU cells yielded similar performance in spite of the higher complexity and thus those results are omitted.
For comparison, the PCA and DPCA models, with the number of principal components determined by parallel analysis and full models without dimension reduction, were also applied. The number of principal components from parallel analysis was determined to be a = 6 for r-PCA and a = 9 for r-DPCA.
Due to the sensitivity of the data, the actual measurement values and the BRNN model predictions are omitted and only the detection and identification results are shown. The posterior predictive distribution was observed to be multi-modal and thus the local density ratio (LDR) statistics were used for fault detection and identification. The number of k-NNs was set to the range of 10 to 20. The dataset was divided into a 35-day training dataset, a 17-day validation dataset, and two testing datasets. The first testing dataset spanned a 7-day period containing Fault-1, and the second testing dataset covered a 14-day period containing Fault-2.
Fault-1 results
The BRNN fault detection and identification results for Fault-1 are shown in Figure 20 . The BRNN model successfully detected the documented event, marked by the red box in the figure.
It also accurately pinpoints the variables that are most affected by the foaming issue, X1.PV and X6.PV. Moreover, it also highlighted several points after the 8000th time point which may have been originally missed. During these later periods, the X1.MV sensor measurement was identified by the BRNN method. This was subsequently verified to have been the result of large unexplained fluctuations in that variable and that the BRNN had performed as expected.
For comparison, the corresponding fault detection and identification results by (D)PCA methods are shown in Figure 21 . The r-PCA and r-DPCA models simply failed to detect the fault. In the contribution plots, the r-PCA and r-DPCA models also failed to identify any variable that was noticeably affected by the foaming event. While (D)PCA models with reduced dimensionality determined by parallel analysis have been widely applied Yin et al., 2014; De Ketelaere et al., 2015; Valle et al., 1999) , they were incapable of accurately detecting the main fault in this case. For f-PCA and f-DPCA models, the T 2 statistic was able to detect the documented fault. The contribution plots also identified X1.PV and X6.PV as being associated with the fault.
However, X1.MV and X6.MV were also identified as abnormal and as more significantly than X1.PV and X6.PV. While those variables were likely affected by the fault, they were operating normally with respect to the control system dynamics and thus should not have been identified. Furthermore, some of these variables continued to be highlighted well after the issue was resolved. The (D)PCA models also only scantly detected the deviations in the later time that were correctly highlighted by the BRNN.
Fault-2 results
The BRNN fault detection and identification results for Fault-2 are shown in Figure 22 . The proposed method successfully detect the documented fault and identifying the related variables, as marked by time interval with the red box. For the earlier period around the 6000th time point, the BRNN model detects a disturbance and identifies the deviation in X14.PV, X15.PV, and X9.PV.
The relative magnitude of the deviation during those time periods is not as significant as that during the documented fault period. This assessment was then verified to be fully warranted by inspection of the recorded sensor measurements. Analysis of the time period around the 15000th data point yielded similar results. As before, the (D)PCA fault detection and identification methods were also applied. Their results are shown in Figure 23 . As observed for Fault-1, the r-PCA and r-DPCA models are not as sensitive to the fault and only partially detected the documented fault time period. The identification plots by the r-PCA and r-DPCA models in Figures 23(a) and (c) also only identified a limited number of faulty variables. The f-PCA and f-DPCA models are again overly sensitive for both fault detection and identification, flagging much of the data time period. After the foaming issue occurred and the operator intervention, the control system is able to compensate for the disturbance after a while.
However, f-PCA and f-DPCA models incorrectly continue to assess the system as in an abnormal state even though the foaming issue had been fully resolved. This can also be observed from the contribution plots in Figures 23(b) and (d) , wherein variables X1.PV and X6.MV are identified as problematic during and long after the resolution of the fault.
To summarize, this case study on real data from a chemical process demonstrates the higher accuracy, specificity, and robustness in fault detection and identification of the BRNN-based method over (D)PCA-based methods. The proposed method is also shown to provide precise and easily interpretable results for prompt diagnosis and mitigation of fault events in real manufacturing processes.
Conclusion
This article proposes a novel BRNN-based fault detection and identification method for manufacturing processes. The proposed method simultaneously tackles three key challenges in modeling real process data: (1) concurrent spatio-temporal correlations, (2) nonlinearity, and (3) incomplete characterization of the uncertainty in process noise and dynamics. The BRNN model addresses these challenges because of its probabilistic framework built on recurrent neural network models. And, for implementation efficiency, inference is done using variational dropout which both regularizes the neural network during training and efficiently estimates the uncertainty as it evolves through time.
The uncertainty estimates of the BRNN model play a crucial role in fault detection and identification. By continuously estimating the uncertainty, the BRNN model provides adaptive confidence intervals that fully characterize the system dynamics based on the current and past information. As demonstrated here, the BRNN framework therefore enables:
(1) fault detection in processes with nonlinear dynamics, and
(2) direct fault identification with easily interpreted identification plots and fault propagation path analysis.
The effectiveness of the proposed BRNN method was demonstrated in two case studies: (1) the benchmark TEP dataset and (2) a real chemical manufacturing dataset. The proposed method was compared to the widely applied PCA and DPCA methods, using either full and reduced dimension models. The comparisons show that the BRNN model provides results that are accurate and more specific and directly relevant for fault identification. Furthermore, based on its results, one can distinguish the nature of the faults, between controllable, back to control, or uncontrollable faults.
More broadly, the application of Bayesian methods to fault detection is not a widely explored field. To that end, this article demonstrates a novel framework involving the systematic application of spatio-temporal models with Bayesian estimation such that the posterior inference results are directly relevant for detection and identification. In this case, a Bayesian RNN was used but the strategy could be adapted for other spatio-temporal models such as dynamic process models.
The proposed BRNN-based fault detection and identification framework can be directly applied to any manufacturing process with historical NOC measurements without significant modifications. Moreover, the easy implementation of variational dropout to any model architecture and concurrent on-line calculating capability make BRNN feasible for large-scale industrial application.
Some considerations for future work might include:
(1) The on-line adaptation of the BRNN model for changing NOC. In real chemical processes, the process conditions evolve and it is unlikely that the training data can cover all of the NOC modes. Thus, on-line adaptation is crucial for reducing false alarms and maintenance costs.
(2) While proposed here for fault detection and identification, the BRNN model framework also has broad potential application in industrial manufacturing process related to time series analysis.
The variational dropout can be applied to any deep learning model no modification of the model architecture, which makes it a preferable probabilistic model as compared to other recent advanced techniques.
